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Intellection and Indiscipline 
PETER GOODRICH* 
A discipline will usually become the object of study and its relationship 
to other disciplines a moment of concern when its borders are pre-
carious and its definition in dispute. Law, 'the oldest social science', is 
arguably both prior to discipline - it emerges initially and most 
forcefully as a practice - and without discipline, its object being 
potentially all human behaviour. If law is necessarily between and 
among disciplines, both prone to moonlighting and everywhere home-
less, it will also always be in some mode of scholarly crisis. Certain 
conclusions follow. Law is paradoxically dependent upon other 
disciplines for its access to the domains that it regulates. The greater 
its epistemic dependency, however, the slighter its political ack-
nowledgment of that subordination. Which allows a positive thesis: the 
epistemic drift of law can carry the discipline to a frank acknowledg-
ment of the value of indiscipline both to novelty and intellection . 
. . . there's some comer of a foreign field 
That is for ever England. There shall be 
In that rich earth a richer dust concealed; 
A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware ... 
(Rupert Brooke) 
The mapping of a discipline is both an historical and a theoretical project. 
When the discipline in question is law and so itself quintessentially 
disciplinary and disciplining, a reality conferring enterprise, then the project 
is more complex still. 1 Viewed over the longue duree, as social structure, as 
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defining the trinity of persons, things, and actions as also institutions and 
norms, law has played a coercive role in relation both to what counts as 
knowledge and with respect to the hierarchy of disciplines. In claiming to 
speak from the space of truth, in issuing verdicts, in thus promulgating 
knowledge that exceeds the vernacular and mundane, law institutes its own 
epistemic field - its jurisdiction - and in the process potentially negates 
those disciplines that lay claim to evaluate the epistemology of legal 
judgment. Not much of this is consciously purveyed in the legal texts most 
normally encountered but, at common law in particular, is rather unwritten, 
tacit, assumed through prior judgments and esoteric codes that allow judges 
to claim variously that law is not logic, that law is not in the words but in the 
truth, that the half truths of one generation become the norms of another, that 
scholarship cannot comprehend the hard law that is case law, that on 
occasion black is white, that men are women, that Barcelona is in London, or 
that tradition, unwritten custom and use, conscience and good morals are 
coeval with and inherently dictate what courts must do. The last vestiges of 
serious social speech are arguably in the hands of self-professed fiction 
mongers, euphantasists, as they were once called, who make things up, and 
sometimes commendably so, to suit their case. 
A discipline is a tradition, both transmission and betrayal of the past. The 
etymology of the word is instructive, coming from a root meaning of disciple 
or follower. The institutions of law are social constructions and what gets 
passed on as knowledge of law is equally a product of relationships, events, 
and networks of dissemination in the schola or classroom, in seminars and 
symposia, in courtrooms and Inns of Court, chambers and council rooms.2 
The discipline controls. It quietly establishes a hierarchy within that reflects 
the hierarchy without. The social system divides epistemically into lesser 
systems. In law too - and why should it be any exception? - groups form, a 
hierarchy is ensconced in the new generation, social norms are established, 
usually tacitly, and others - defined by race, class, gender, political or 
theoretical affiliation, by lack of credentializing status - are excluded. The 
establishment reconvenes in slightly younger form and the order of juristic 
things gains its new mediations, its embodiment and expression, its tokens of 
success, its symbols of status, its figures of truth. A new generation takes on 
the self-disciplining functions of bureaucracy, and how easily that role seems 
to be assumed. It is important to a critical apprehension of the sociology of 
knowledge that such networks, movements, schools, trends, and fashions 
2 F. Wacquet, Les Enfants de Socrate. Filiation intellectuelle et transmission du savoir 
XVII-XXJ siecle (2008) provides an extraordinary history of the master-disciple 
relationship in the academic world. On the conflict between discipline and law, see, 
particularly, M. Foucault, Society Must be Defended (2003). For a recent collection of 
encounters between and among disciplines, but with law not included, see J. Chandler 
and A. Davidson (eds.), The Fate of the Disciplines, published as (2009) 35:4 Critical 
Inquiry. 
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also be traced as the lines of power or fields of force that contingently dictate 
what constitutes truth about law, or in the rather shoddily applied terms of 
research assessment exercises, what is excellent or internationally 
recognized or properly part of the core discipline. Such lists or putative 
appraisals of contacts and associations, the hierarchy of persons and actions, 
texts and letters, becomes the form of life, the grid through which the 
discourse of law flows. It plays its role, in turn, in defining and circulating 
things, bodies, and words, the key elements in the longer-term patterns of 
epistemological development, institutional presence and definition. They are 
what defines the discipline and they also dictate its relationship to other 
disciplines, because the interdisciplinary is as much a matter of culture and 
mentalite, of the theory of comparison, as it is an abstract question of purely 
systemic interrelations. 3 
In what follows I will make the argument that understanding the inter-
disciplinary requires that the element of the 'inter', the aspect of 
homelessness, of drift, of spaces between and without archos or law is 
intrinsic. The properly interdisciplinary travels betwixt and through dis-
ciplines, it appears at intervals, is there and gone, indisciplined in the 
positive sense of pleated and becoming, nascent, inchoate, not yet known. 
There should be an element of indiscipline to the trajectory and evaluation of 
any discipline. Irreverent questions are needed. Such as what did you enjoy? 
Did this tell us anything? Was their passion, force, wit in this conversation? 
And by the same token, flipside, stripped of regalia, status credentials, 
hierarchical pinnacles, the aura of seriousness and self-worth, was this text or 
speech still bearable? Relevant? Engaged with thought? Thinking for itself? 
In that spirit I will first map the jurisdictions and disciplinary roots of our 
dear English common law and subsequently move to track the relationship 
between that history, those tendrils, roots, and branches of a tradition, a way 
of knowing, a form of life, and the other disciplines with which law engages 
and against which it oftentimes defines itself. The current crisis in legal 
studies lies very much in the fact that law can no longer act in such a 
negative manner nor claim such hauteur or superiority as once was the 
effortless and not always unwarranted garb of the iuris peritus or doctor of 
law. 
3 This point is extensively and well argued by Pierre Legrand. See, for example, the -
discussion, ending with the concept of comparison as caress: P. Legrand, 'The Same 
and the Different' in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, eds. P. 
Legrand and R. Munday (2003) 240-311. 
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MOS BRITANNICUS 
First the backface, the long term of common law as a discipline.4 It bears 
restatement if only because the Englishness of common law is part of a 
political imaginary, a literary fiction on the part of lawyers, and this merits 
elaboration. As with any of the arts, the first question is the relation oflaw to 
Latin and the transmission of the classic texts. The Renaissance reception of 
Roman law falls into three parts. This tripartite geographical and loosely 
jurisdictional division also suggests a threefold method of law. If we follow 
the academic lawyer Giorgio Agamben's recent and riveting history of 
W estem administration, a narrative that he elucidates as based upon the 
Trinitarian theology of 'oeconomy' - meaning rhetorical disposition as well 
as household management - then the trilogy of European legal methods can 
also be understood in terms of doctrinal differences. 5 
The position of the father is occupied by Roman law, the infinitely 
detailed scholastic exposition of the Corpus iuris civi/is and the so-called 
mos ltalicus of the predominantly German jurisdictions that stuck strictly to 
the text, the letter of the Roman exemplar. 6 This law of the father could 
speak through all merely temporal jurisdictions and local expressions. It was 
the basis of a science whose laboratory was not even as diverse as Langdell's 
later (and equally teutonic) reliance upon the constraint of the law library. 
For the first generation of glossators, the science of law was based on a 
single body of books housed in a single room in a tower in Pisa where the 
Florentine manuscript of Justinian's text was guarded jealously behind 
barred windows and a locked door, coming out only at night to be read under 
guard and by candlelight. The second position, that of the son, both filial and 
in Freud's terms oedipal, is taken by the French school, technically that of 
the mos Gallicus, in which the work of the father is taken up by destroying 
the father in favour of historical method, philological precision, and attention 
to the earlier sources upon which the Corpus iuris was based. Justinian, or 
4 G. Samuel, 'Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken 
Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?' (2009) 36 J of Law and Society 431-
59. Samuel does not address the English Renaissance and Anglican humanist tradition 
in law, nor does he include it in 'the rather short' history of its scholarship. What 
follows here is a supplement and corrective. The notion of a backface is taken from J. 
Selden, The reverse or back-face of the English Janus (first published as Jani 
Anglorum facies altera, in 1610) and designates the hidden or 'other' history of 
common law, its secrets, its skeletons, its positive unconscious. 
5 G. Agamben, Le regne et la gloire: Homo sacer II,2 (2008), an extended meditation 
on the maxim rex regnat sed non gubernat (the sovereign rules but does not govern). 
T. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? Configurations of Law and Modernity (1997) 
makes a variant but comparable argument in terms of a distinction between the 
penetrative scheme and the juridical soul. 
6 For an introduction to the distinction, see P. Stein, Roman Law in European History 
(1999) 75 ff. A more detailed discussion can be found in D. Kelley, The Human 
Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition (1990) chs. 8 and 11. 
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more politicly, Tribonian, the chief compiler, became the name of an error.7 
Standing on the shoulders of the classical giant, the early modem humanists 
relied upon philology, the historical method, to see further than the ancients, 
and specifically further than Justinian and Tribonian who had so hurriedly 
compiled the master text that was now to be unravelled. 
Finally, third but not least, there is the mos Britannicus, the Anglican and 
thoroughly mixed tradition of common law. 8 The holy spirit is a hybrid 
figure, part father, part son, filial and rebellious, providential and practical; it 
is associated by Agamben with the classical chorus, and specifically with the 
rituals, acclamations, liturgies, and praises that both invest the sovereign and 
express the genius loci, the unwritten spirit of locale or terrae. For the 
English, it is the integrity of the island that seems to matter most and that 
needs to gain expression in the insular identity of the laws. Thus the 
expulsion of the first Rome, that of the papacy and the pontifical jurisdiction, 
gained secondary expression in a fierce, if often imaginary, nationalism of 
common law. This was a tradition distinct from that of the civilians, a pattern 
of practices and precedents that preceded books of law and did not need 
written expression except as contingent evidence of prior oral forms. The 
seamless web of common law was a species of the map that is described by 
Borges as being identical in size to the terrain being mapped. The common 
law was a myriad of cases and it was cases, not book law, that were enrolled, 
tabled, and fined, as also mooted and bolted. 
Of all the three traditions of European law, the mos Britannicus is 
historically the one that is furthest removed from the universities and the 
least prone to exposition of its own method. Critical though the common 
lawyers were of the civilians, they were also subject to and aware of the 
lambasting of Anglican law as a junk-pile of cases lacking method and open 
to manipulation, to borrow a phrase, by the most unlearned of learned 
professions.9 This poor illiterate reason was not simply less than science, it 
was not even a discipline, and so desperately needed the aid of Latin and 
learning which could together reform and systematize this boundless 
pursuit. 10 It was not only the civilians who criticized the common lawyers. 
7 On the emblemata Triboniani, see V. Hayaert, Mens emblematica et humanisme 
juridique (2008) 111-47. For discussion of emblems and other epistemological 
engimas, see P. Goodrich, 'Legal Enigmas: Antonio de Nebrija, The Da Vinci Code 
and the Emendation of Law' (2010) 30 Oxford J. of Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
8 Mos Britannicus is sometimes used to refer to the Druidic style but I am striving here 
for a juridical neologism. It might be that mos Angliae is more accurate but it does not 
fit the tripartite scheme quite so well. 
9 The source is Erasmus, but the citation is from Sir J. Doderidge, The English Lawyer. 
Describing a Method/or the managing of the Lawes of this Land (1631) 33 : ' in scome 
some have called the crew of unlearned Lawyers, Doc/um quoddam genus 
indoctorum hominum'. 
IO Sir R. Wiseman, The Law of Laws: or the Excellency of the Civil Law Above all 
Humane Laws Whatsoever ( 1666) is the most lucid, systematic, and convincing of the 
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There was 'The Reverent and Learned Sir John Doderidge Knight, one of the 
Justices of the Kings Bench, lately deceased' who in 1631, which truth be 
told is not that lately, suggested in his treatise on legal method that we need 
to commend some of the 'sedentarie' judges of yore, who: 
were men excellently skilled in all generall good learning, as doe witnesse the 
works of that worthy Judge Henry de Bracton, and John Britton sometimes a 
learned Bishop of Hereford, skilfull in the Lawes of this Realme. 11 
There were also dissident Anglican critics, internal opponents, amongst 
whom we can trace a course which would include the theologian Cardinal 
Reginald Pole, the philosopher Abraham Fraunce, the polymathic William 
Fulbeck, the Ramist systematizer Sir Henry Finch, the jurist and humanist 
advocates of codification of common law, Thomas Lupset, Francis Bacon 
and, much later, Jeremy Bentham, and now, in this instance, ecce homo, a 
university man, a francophile, my former colleague (his office was opposite 
mine at Lancaster University back in the era of big hair), Professor Geoffrey 
Samuel. 12 He asks two related questions. Is law a science? If it is not, if it has 
no special disciplinary identity - as opposed to authority and status - then 
what contribution does law make to the university or the episteme? These are 
questions that sound peculiar to modern ears, anachronistic perhaps, 
syncretic even in being radical and academic, internal to law and yet 
sharply critical of its method. 
THE LIBERAL SCIENCE OF LAW 
The backstory is reasonably well known. At the time that the printing presses 
turned to making common law available, the English, with their usual flair 
for compromise and confusion, were teaching Roman law in the universities, 
recording court proceedings in Latin, arguing in a garbled species of French, 
and practising a predominantly local law, a formulaic system of writs and 
local customs mixed with royal edict and decree. The first significant drive 
to reform common law did not really aspire to present law as a science but 
rather to introduce a little learning, a touch of disciplinary skill, a modicum 
of method, into the presentation and teaching of law during the course of 
critics. I traverse some of this literature in P. Goodrich, 'Critical Legal Studies in 
England: Prospective Histories' (1992) 12 Oxford J of Legal Studies 195. On the 
status of Latin and its educatiooal history, see F. Wacquet, Latin, or, the Empire of a 
Sign: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries (200 I). 
11 Doderidge, op. cit., n. 9, p. 33. 
12 My initial inspiration here is to respond to Samuel, op. cit., n. 4. Also important are G. 
Samuel, 'Droit Compare et theorie du droit' (2006) Revue Jnterdisciplinaire d 'etudes 
juridiques I; G. Samuel, 'ls Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative 
Law' (2008) 67 Cambridge Law J. 288; G. Samuel, 'Can Legal Reasoning be 
Demystified?' (2009) 29 Legal Studies 181. 
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apprenticeship at the Inns of Court. A diversity of factors seem to have been 
in play. The presses exposed common law to a degree of literate public 
scrutiny, aided also by the translation of law texts into the vernacular. The 
technological change brought a heightened degree of criticism of legal 
pettyfoggers, and wrought a shift in the institutional self-consciousness of 
lawyers. A more structural facet of reform was the paradoxical drive to 
distance common law from both the papacy and the continent, the tincture of 
Normanism, as it was then called, while at the same time resorting to 
classical treatises on method, Roman rhetorical handbooks, and the latest in 
continental theory to reform the Anglican morass of 'commune ley'. This 
theological and political assertion of the sovereignty of the English monarch 
and the national distinction of common law was ironically carried through by 
borrowing from the very continentals who, at the political level, were being 
disparaged and evicted from the curriculum of prefatory discourses to 
institutional treatises, occasional polemics, and sparsely reported precedents. 
The historical details can be followed elsewhere; for present purposes it is 
important not to allow either temporal distance, or linguistic unfamiliarity, or 
technical opacity to disguise the early meaning of interdisciplinary legal 
study. For practical purposes, and notwithstanding its itinerant excursions 
into the provinces, common law was a royally dispensed enterprise taught, 
determined, and housed in a collection of Inns located next to the theatres in 
central London. In American jargon, common law was an off-Broadway 
production, a theatre of justice and truth that obeyed a distinct but not wholly 
different set of unities to those of the dramatic stages that adjoined and on 
occasion even reproduced it. 13 Legal drama was a ritual enterprise, a 
ceremony of truth, a solemn exercise in dicta and dictation without any very 
evident scholarly apparatus, disciplinary identity or theoretical support 
beyond the theology of sovereignty and the diverse patterns of a multiple 
linguistic and cultural heritage that mingled Saxon lists, Gaelic rites, and 
Norman customs. 
The common lawyers turned to their continental contemporaries. The 
Prince or principal reformer resorted to by the scholars and humanists 
amongst the common lawyers was Petrus Ramus, the neo-scholastic French 
exponent of dialectical method as the means to schematize and so 
systematize any discipline whatsoever. It was Ramist logic that inspired 
the reform of legal method from Fraunce to Finch. It was an external and 
foreign influence, a continental fashion in philosophy that brought common 
law face to face with the failings of its pedagogy and the inadequacies of its 
13 On the relation between the Inns of Court and the stage, see S. Mukherji, Law and 
Representation in Early Modern Drama (2006) ch. 5; on the internal stages of the 
Inns, see P. Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice 
and Power, I 558-1660 (2004). For the interesting architectural observation that the 
Inns are designed as an ear, see D. Evans, 'The Inns of Court: Speculations on the 
Body of Law' (1993) I Arch-Text 5. 
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methods. So much so, if a pun is permitted, that George Ruggles, one of the 
best of university based satirists of the logical and linguistic lacunae of 
native law, invents the epithet Ignoramus - ignorant of Ramus - as the name 
of his pitiful protagonist, 'an English lawyer', and of his eponymous play. 14 
First point then, prima regula, common lawyers as a guild were resistant to 
the competing claims of method and scholarship, publicity and vernacular 
dissemination, that the Renaissance and the winds of humanist reform 
demanded of them. They needed criticism, satirical prompting, theatrical 
denunciation to force them to think and to change. 
Common law grew up outside the established university system and 
curriculum. It was an insular law lodged and developed in an architectural 
island in London. It has a structural antipathy to scholarship and method, 
expressed most directly and still to some degree, in the guild mentality of the 
practice and the professional constraint upon education as most obviously 
dictated by the latter stages of training, the non-academic phase. Let me not 
get ahead, however, of either nomos or narrative. The initial point is that the 
common law gloried in an oral and auditory tradition, a practical mentality 
devised in lists and rolls, chancelleries and chambers, and it was only the 
technological changes generated by print, pressure from outside, the barbs of 
satire, and the castigations of pamphleteers and dramatists that forced change 
into the other-worldly atmosphere of the juridical cloisters. A political 
exchange, a coming to terms with the exigencies of the day which led, in one 
clever exercise of renaming, to the Inns of Court becoming called 'The 
Thirde Universitie' .15 
The second point, if one reads the sources, is that the emergence of 
common law as a discipline was a rather sorry affair. The trajectory could be 
framed as follows. Common law is inherently a practice rather than a theory, 
method, or scholarly tradition. As a practice, it engages with the social 
pathologies of everyday life, as well as facilitating the transactions of 
commerce, the passage of property to and through death, the status and 
offices of persons. It deals with everything and so also, in methodological 
terms, with nothing. Law, as a practical activity, a guild knowledge of which 
writ to file, when, and in what place, did not seem to cry out for scholarly 
elaboration. The lawyer knew the law, a set of rites tied to the resolution or 
displacement of conflict and controversy. To this all too recognizable anti-
intellectualism and dogma, the humanists opposed the necessity of art and 
knowledge of 'the Sciences Liberall'. 
14 G. Ruggles, Ignoramus. Comoedia Coram regia maiestate Jacobi Regis Angliae 
(1630). The play was first performed in Cambridge in 1615. 
15 See G. Bue, The Third Universitie of England (1615) vol. 3, at 966: 
But admit that this city had no other colleges in it: but the Inns of Court, nor other 
sciences studied and professed in it, but the laws, yet might London (as Justice 
Fortescue well observed, and held) be as worthily styled a university as either 
Angers or Orleans in France, or as Pavia, or Perugia in Italy, wherein the study of 
civil law, is only professed. 
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Using Sir John Doderidge, author of one of the first substantive treatises 
on common law method, as my principal example, the initial task is one of 
saving the profession from the potential embarrassment and consequent 
social obloquy caused by uncouthness and stupidity. This very basic 
desideratum gains expression as a double negative: 'We seeke not hereby to 
institute I know not what manner of vulgar professor of the Lawes, no 
common blatterer or temerist ... '. 16 There are plenty of similar examples but 
the point is that of the evident expression of tension and stress between guild 
and academy, cloister and community. The first task of scholarship is in this 
respect curious and illuminating. A more rigorous education will produce a 
better image of the lawyer, and Doderidge's text on method indeed begins, 
first page, entry for content, by exhorting those that study law to 'covet and 
contemplate with their inward eye the expresse and perfect Image of an 
English Lawyer'. 17 Art can aid in improving the public perception of the 
profession and it can facilitate dissemination and acceptance of decisions if 
the lawyers know what they are talking about. If, to borrow one of 
Doderidge's examples, a case concerns 'a maime ', say loss of an arm, then 
the advice of surgeons and medics should be sought so as to understand what 
the injury means. Without knowledge, law is vacant. 
The remedy for juridical ignorance is also interesting. Law touches 
potentially on all disciplines. It is truly interdisciplinary in the sense of being 
without discipline. There are two reasons for this. The first is that 
jurisprudence is, for civilians and common lawyers alike, a knowledge of 
things divine and human. In touching matters spiritual, in addressing and 
being addressed by the divinity, law reflects whatever God or sovereign 
might care to say. And they can, as we know, on occasion say anything: 
declare war on imaginary grounds, devise elaborate internal regimes of 
expense account, announce, in a recent example in the United States, that the 
medically dead are still living. So too, the causes that come before the 
lawyer, the pathology, madness, and injuries that get litigated can call upon 
any number of skills of apprehension and determination. That being so, the 
best training is general and expansive. Law, in Ramist Latin, is scientia 
scientiarum, the Science of Sciences: 
and therein lies hid the knowledge almost of every other learned science: But 
yet I pray consider, that those forraine knowledges, are not inherent or inbred 
in the Lawes, but rather as a borrowed light not found there, but brought 
thither .. . 18 
All knowledge is potentially relevant to law. All disciplines can be invoked, 
or nest hidden there, and law must be open to them. Doderidge is not 
exceptional in making this argument. We find it also in Fraunce and in 
16 Doderidge, op. cit., n. 9, p. 39. 
17 id. , p. I. 
18 id., p. 35. 
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Fulbeck, in Cowell and in Finch. The mark of the excellent lawyer is 
'generall good learning' .19 Everything within the liberal sciences, the 
conceptual disciplines, that might train the mind or increase the knowledge 
of the subject will be of aid. 
Lastly, and here we approach most directly the concerns of Professor 
Samuel, the specific method for acquisition and manipulation of the 
knowledges that are necessary to law, comes traditionally in the form of the 
invocation of reason or the necessity of logic. Law may be unamenable to 
scientific method in its modem sense, in that it can never be practised in a 
closed environment, as also it will always concern human relations which, 
according to Aristotle amongst others, are not amenable to certainty but only 
to probability. That does not mean, however, that law cannot in its operation 
and application be subject to method, to disposition (oeconomialdispositio) , 
and to systematization. The substantive curriculum in law, as devised by the 
Ramists, was an exercise in scholastic reasoning, in dialectic and then the 
rhetoric of argument. The best example is probably Finch's Nomotechnia, or 
'Art of Law' .20 We start with general propositions, the maxims of law that 
Fortescue and then Bacon had elaborated as the exempla of legal argument. 
Clothed in Latin, and tabulated according to discipline, the maxims find their 
best systematization in Noy's collection compiled in the 1640s and 
organized according to their disciplines of origin: theology, grammar, logic, 
philosophy, politics, morality, law, and custom.21 Other authors offer similar 
schemes of seemingly esoteric though in fact quite ordinary propositions 
from diverse disciplines. From these premises, arguments can be drawn and 
methods of logical schematization developed. Fraunce is to the same 
effect. 22 One takes the cases, extracts a maxim, a dictum, a rule and then 
elaborates it. 
It is the fate of government and law as practices, as opposed to sovereign 
pronouncements, divine decrees or other manifestations of regnum 
providentiae or absolute power, to exist in uncertainty and probability.23 
They deal with relations and they require, returning momentarily to 
Agamben' s thesis, management and administration, accommodation, and 
disposition in the sense of ordering, which we now more positively term 
19 id.,p.33. 
20 Sir H. Finch, Nomotechnia (1613). I have used the 1759 edition, published in English 
as Law or a Discourse Thereof in Four Books. On the various texts and translations, 
see W. Prest, 'The Dialectical Origins of Finch's Law' (1977) 36 Cambridge Law J. 
326. 
21 W. Noy, The Grounds and Maxims, and also an Analysis of the English Laws (1641 / 
1808). 
22 A. Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike, exemplifying the praecepts of logike by the practise 
of the common !awe ( 1588). 
23 Agamben, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 197- 203 usefully elaborates on the theology of the 
distinction between providence and destiny as at the root of the distinction between 
sovereignty and government as administration. 
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method. That being so, the early-modern move to systematize law did not 
push to constitute law as an autonomous discipline but, rather, sought to 
equip the lawyer with a training that would draw on all relevant disciplines 
and would recognize that this borrowing or translation into law required a 
degree of tact. It was important that the lawyer appeared well educated, 
articulate, knowledgeable, and equipped to judge. Jurisprudence, as one later 
systematizer of the visual presence of law expressed it, is the 'image of the 
public good'. 24 Logic, dialectic, and rhetoric could help substantially in 
perfecting that image of the lawyer and in retailing the institution and 
profession. The disciplines have their uses, a sentiment that Doderidge 
elaborates in terms of 'sciences and vertues intellectuall adorning the minde, 
as the Liberall'. 25 The lawyer brings at best their innate in genii acumen or 
ready understanding to these diverse pursuits. The law is the outsider. It is 
not as if there is anything particularly special about law as a discipline, even 
if the external and foreign sources of its respectability are generally kept well 
hidden. They are, as we have reviewed, generally continental and civilian, 
theoretical and textualist. 
THE METHOD OF INDISCIPLINE 
What is past is prologue. This is so in several senses. I will draw on two. 
First, a new technology generates what Derrida wittily called a 'crisis of 
destination' and thence a move to self-reflection, a hermeneutic reappraisal, 
within the disciplines.26 The internet has not only repeated the seismic shift 
that print had earlier enacted upon the disciplines but it has also in many 
respects undone the hierarchy of texts as well as both the sanctity and storage 
of law that had been achieved by print and the indefinite murmur of writing 
confined to libraries. The new media generate a new world, a novel con-
figuration of ordo, lex, medium in the classical trinity.27 Homo juridicus, the 
space of law, the discipline of the jurist, the interdisciplinary knowledge of 
law have all again come under critical scrutiny, as also have the ethics of the 
lawyer and the justice of legal judgment. The mos Britannicus seems more 
than ever, or perhaps simply again and visibly disordered, somewhat 
random, lacking in scholarly discipline, theory, and method. This is what 
Samuel is concerned with and focused upon in a recent book, as also in an 
expansive series of articles published both here (which is to say there, 
namely England) and in France. 
Professor Samuel is so disillusioned with common law method, so 
despairing of building a discipline out of the Anglican tradition, that he 
24 F. Menestrier, Le Veritable art du blason (1673) preface. 
25 Doderidge, op. cit., n. 9, p. 36. 
26 J. Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1992) 232. 
27 On which, see P. Goodrich, 'Screening Law' (2009) 21 law and literature I. 
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focuses almost exclusively upon the history of Roman law, and the mos 
Gallicus in particular. He is concerned to pose rhetorical questions. 'Is law 
really a social science?' The answer is no, it is a dogmatic pursuit within an 
authority paradigm. 'Can legal reasoning be demystified?' The answer is no, 
or at least not by lawyers playing at philosophy within an authority 
paradigm: they are 'just rearranging the deckchairs on a fantasy ship'. 28 
Finally, 'should law be taken seriously by scientists and social scientists?' 
The answer is no, law is trapped, as you have doubtless only very recently 
read, in an authority paradigm that precludes any very meaningful con-
tribution either to science or to sociology. We need, in this view, to step 
away from the authority paradigm, show some respect to the other 
disciplines, and endeavour to comprehend, though here I am pushing his 
argument somewhat, the community of lawyers as a somewhat idiosyncratic 
form of life. To do this, we would do best to tum to continental thought, to 
treatises on epistemology, and specifically to the study of method as 
elaborated in and through comparative legal theory. It is not rights so much 
as it is method that needs to be taken seriously.29 Sound familiar? This, of 
course, is precisely the theme that I have traced in the earlier English 
tradition. Common law needed method, it was as extant a sorry mixture of 
pathology and system, case and commentary that could only be deemed as 
lacking in both scholarship and logic by the Ramist inspired authors of the 
foundational era of properly Anglican government. 
The earlier era of reform, the erudition of Fraunce, Fulbeck, and Finch, 
Smith, Spellman, Selden to name but a few, did not have too great a practical 
or, shall we say, distributive impact upon the discipline of law. Therein lies 
the interest in returning to them. They were never really incorporated, their 
suggestions remained suggestions. No successful university curriculum in 
common law was devised - the third university aside - and the compromises 
and conflicts between professionals and professors remained unresolved and 
seldom did the two meet or talk outside of the elite arches of Oxbridge where 
the discussions were more political than technical. When Dicey and others, 
and most notably Langdell in the United States, propelled common law into 
the university curriculum in the late nineteenth century, not so long ago as 
Samuel opines, their model, predicated closely on the suggestions of the 
Ramists as purveyed through Blackstone, in the end did little more than 
institute the tired schematic curriculum of cases, a compromise between 
profession and scholarship that so favoured the professional that it was 
practitioners and not scholars who formed the advanced guard of the new 
university discipline, did the teaching, and compiled the professional and 
pedagogic manuals. And then, as Samuel at one point caustically and 
incisively notes, law is taught today as it was taught 50 years ago. One could 
28 Samuel, op. cit. (2009), n. 12, p. 210. 
29 G. Samuel, 'Taking Methods Seriously (Part One)' (2007) 2 J. of Comparative Law 
94, and 'Taking Methods Seriously (Part Two)' (2007) 2 J. of Comparative Law 210. 
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expand that. It is taught now pretty much as it was taught 100 years ago in 
the early days of the new syllabus. It is taught as a collection of cases 
organized around thematic topics conjured in the main from the subject-
matter of the decisions studied. Add a few European Directives, some 
statutory subject-matter, a few classes on the legal system and its component 
parts, throw in an incoherent discussion of the 'essential' (and essentially 
contested) distinction between rationes decidendi and obiter dicta, and stop 
there. An elective in jurisprudence, an option in gender, crime, sociology of 
law, or some even more eccentric course on law 'and' - literature, history, 
film, aesthetics, psychoanalysis - may bring the student into contact with the 
questions of method and discipline that Samuel raises, but these are by now, 
at this point in the curriculum, secondary engagements, not real law but 
school lore. 30 So the argument and the practice goes. 
Support for Samuel's argument can be taken from some other 
contemporary sources. He mentions the lesser status of comparative law, 
if genuinely treated as comparative, and notes the frequent characterization 
of such an interest as a form of dilettantism, as if method, thought about the 
discipline, was an ornament, an illicit pleasure, a distraction. We can add 
Supiot's Homo juridicus, an extended meditation on the growing irrelevance 
of law, its subversion and marginalization by the internationalization of 
markets and the global yet virtual presence of the web.31 Market drive, law 
and economics, the absolutes of cost benefit analysis, the ecfactic calculus 
take over the space of thought and hence also the terrain of law. 32 So, too, 
the boundaries of promulgation and implementation are eradicated by the 
fluidity of fibre optics, wireless connections, and the laptop computer which 
can connect any subject, anywhere, to any place: appropriately enough the 
terminal is now called (Mac) 'Air', and nominally at least invokes a 
Pythagorean metaphysics. What cannot be confined to a jurisdiction escapes 
law. If territorial competence is a precondition of judgment, of the lex terrae 
as such, if the juridical is by definition attached to and circumscribed by text 
and territory, then the erosion of the boundaries of text and territory, the 
slippage into spectral portals, hypertext markup language (html), and the 
virtuality of the world wide web are all potentially witness to the diffusion 
and evaporation of the concept and procedures of legality. As Linda 
Mulcahy points out in her study of video appearances in court, you don't 
30 C. McCrudden, 'Legal Research and the Social Sciences' (2006) Law Q. Rev. 632, 
argues that we are all socio-legal now, and this may be true, as F. Cowney, Legal 
Academics: Culture and Identities (2004) rather depressingly suggests, but this says a 
lot about the law professor's self-perception as a scholar and nothing of what they 
teach or do within the institution as a mode of reproduction of law. 
31 A. Supiot, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of Law (2007), and for 
commentary, see P. Goodrich, 'Law's Labour's Lost' (2009) 72 Modern Law Rev. 
296. 
32 On the ecfactic calculus, see P. Goodrich, 'The New Casuistry' (2007) 33 Critical 
Inquiry 673, at 700. 
472 
© 2009 The Author. Journal Compilation © 2009 Cardiff University Law School 
really any longer have to show up. You can teleport in on a hard line, arrive 
as an image, answer in real time but from no legally recognized place, 
engendering perhaps a modern version of a classical legal fiction, which 
would go something like 'Xis on earth, Mars or Kansas, to wit in London'. 33 
From a different though associated perspective the international 
community also suffers a species of demise along with the erasure of 
national boundaries. The fragmentation is well delineated by Carty in his 
Philosophy of International Law, a book that argues most forcefully that 
there is no philosophy of international law.34 This absence of method 
deprives international law not only of any disciplinary identity but also of 
any critical or political relevance. Where Supiot, writing in a French context, 
argues that dogma and doctrine are suffering a contemporary destruction at 
the hands of international corporate self-interest, political indifference, and 
legal academic ineptitude - the blankness of 'law and economics' - leading 
to incoherent or inaudible resistance in favour of thought, Carty too views 
the decline in common lawyers' critical apprehension of international law as 
lying squarely in their lack of erudition and their failure of will. The legal 
academy is more supine than disciplining in any strong sense, effectively 
abandoning doctrine, the invention of thought, scholarship proper and 
political, in favour of simply systematizing what states do and what 
international courts of precarious jurisdiction and dubious authority happen 
to say. The unhappy consciousness of the legal academic here proves 
debilitating rather than provoking any sustained intervention in the sources 
of unease, the practices of states. 
There is a common trajectory to follow, a critical evaluation of a historical 
lack of will, a refusal of intellectual discipline within the legal academy, a 
resistance to theory, and an abdication of the creative role of doctrine as 
something more than second-order law reporting. The fault lies as much on 
the left as on the right, indeed, more so in that there is at least a species of 
guild consistency in excluding scholarly critical re-evaluation from the 
pragmatic isolationism of law as a solemnizing institution and serious social 
theatre of justice and truth. The absence of theory is the thorn that pricks 
Samuel's side, and which he tracks remorselessly in terms of the failure to 
generate a discourse on method, leaving the legal academy without any 
independent object of study, and equally without intellectual purpose beyond 
self-reproduction of the guild. There is no answer to the fundamental question 
of what is doctrine, no discourse on whether it is anything more than or of any 
greater scholarly and political value than retailing what courts say. It is a 
question that Carty attacks in terms of the history of international lawyers 
treating the state as sacrosanct and so immune to meaningful critique because 
33 L. Mulcahy, 'The Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards the Virtual Trial' 
(2008) 35 J. of Law and Society 464, where she also notes the eradication of 
thresholds occasioned by video links. 
34 A. Carty, The Philosophy of International Law (2007). 
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the proper object of legal academic choirs and juridical acclamations lies in 
celebration and promulgation of an unquestioned norm. The left mirrors 
acclamation in the mode of heckling, demystification, and denunciation with 
an equal absence of substantive content. Samuel treats a similar phenomenon 
in comparative law, an exemplary inter-discipline for his argument: lacking 
training in method, without critical tools with which to address the social 
pathologies, political over-investments, and relational corporate contexts 
with which law, national and international, regulatory and facilitative, has to 
deal, lawyers can offer little beyond the mouthing of platitudes and the timid 
vacuity of school-bound academic law, that very English idiom: 'it is 
fervently to be hoped that their Lordships will reconsider the remit and 
nuance of their decision in Seldom v. Never'; 'one is bound to acknowledge, 
though with the utmost respect, that the Court perhaps erred on the side of 
gratuitous generosity in their interpretation of Cribbed v. Constrained'; 
'authority resiles to the fact that the rule in Minimal v. Nothing is now to be 
deemed otiose ' , and such and similar in tone and affray. 
If we accept that the new technologies unsettle the time-honoured 
practices of professionalization of law students and equally acknowledge 
that this is not a novelty but just another historic challenge to an institution 
that changes only when it is left with no political choice but to change, then 
there are some preliminary conclusions to be drawn from the contemporary 
encounter, the dissonance between disciplines and law. The first is simple 
enough and common to all of the contemporary critics mentioned, Supiot 
and Samuel, Carty, Murphy, and Legrand. These critics are marginal and 
uncomfortable figures . Like Petrus Ramus and Abraham Fraunce, they 
appear foreign, external, ill at ease, and frankly estranged in common law. It 
is tempting, maybe salutary is a better word, to look at the excursions and the 
exodus, the diaspora of the critics of English law as an exemplification of the 
thesis not only that thresholds and boundaries have disappeared but also that 
there has been a species of more unsettling flight. A generation in exile 
perhaps. Consider the geographic dispersion as a metaphor for disciplinary 
displacement, a movement to the margins of cartograph and curriculum 
alike. This can be read as a species of taking a break, on the model of a 
couple having some time apart, or as divorce in a jurisdiction that still 
requires cause and so leaves the couple married but separated. Put it another 
way, and one can observe that the critics are not relating either to England or 
to law very much any longer. As Samuel puts it, there is little on offer in the 
common law schools to excite the intellect. He has a favourite example: 
three students leave for university to study sociology, cinema, and Iaw.35 The 
first two get an education that includes a significant dimension of theory, the 
law student does not. The cinema student will graduate with an under-
standing of film technique, of director's styles, and of theoretical schools and 
35 Samuel , op. cit. (2008), n. 12, p. 31 I. For further discussion, see Samuel, op. cit. (Part 
I), n. 29, pp. 105- 10. 
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approaches, and will be able to distinguish hermeneutics, structuralism, 
deconstruction, and functionalism. The law student will graduate with none 
of that or at least with only the very loosest of senses of the methodology of 
law - it is like a chain novel, it is what officials do, it is commands or rules -
and almost no conception of the long-term history of the discipline, of the 
mos Britannicus as expounded briefly here. They graduate with the narrowest 
of conceptions of system and law, akin for all essential purposes to the 
blinkered world of faith that confines the graduating student in theology. 
Except that the theology student knows that God moves in mysterious ways, 
that the choir invisible cannot be seen, and so has been taught to address 
'what is not' and has no being through faith and prayer. So perhaps Samuel's 
example of the cinema student is a better guide, closer to my interests 
anyway, and the disjunction can be clarified somewhat. The film student 
learns film criticism, the schools of cinematic thought - and the history is 
here genuinely not that long-lived, be it in England or abroad - as well as the 
oeuvre of great directors, national and international. Further, however, and 
this is surely crucial, the student of film learns how to make a film, how to 
produce images, how to assemble, cut, fade and frame, track and pan, build a 
scene, a flashback, a montage. Law students are not so well served. They 
learn about the schools in jurisprudence, should they elect it, and they read 
some of the sages of common law, the great judges, the mavericks and 
innovators, but that is not systematic, does not come with method or 
diachronic engagement. Worse, the making of law, the production of norms, 
the commercial and political assembling of bodies of judgment, patterns of 
normative development, the grids within which genres of precedent are 
constructed are never the object of critical theoretical examination. The law 
student is not simply not taught to examine the process of legal production 
and reproduction of doctrine as a social form but they are positively 
dissuaded from engaging with the authorship of judgments, the directorial 
capacities of judges, the assemblage and scenography of decision. 
Stay with this separation for a moment. It has two sides. The distance 
between critic and discipline mirrors that between theory and law. The law 
curriculum may not study or provide insight into theory, but then the 
theorists in the end or in exile offer no real reading of law. David Campbell 
made the point well in a necessarily satirical piece in which he pointed out 
that when social theory descended upon law in the 80s, the theorists were 
unimpeded by any knowledge of law. Not a clue, he points out, as to the 
substantive rules and practices that they were demolishing, revising, 
deriding, summoning and sentencing en masse. 36 Samuel makes a version 
36 D. Campbell, 'The Limits of Concept Formation in Legal Science ' (2000) 9 Social 
and Legal Studies 439, especially at 441 : 
In studying law as it were internally, in the sense of being able to reason as a 
lawyer, and especially to handle the sources of the law, one immediately gains the 
advantage so often lost in general social theory, of tending to know what one is 
talking about. 
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of the same point at a more ab5tract level but quite explicitly: 'If, then, 
escape is on the agenda, perhaps law schools should start by looking in much 
more diachronic depth at the construction of their discipline '. 37 Then, of 
course, Samuel himself escapes, at least to some degree, by addressing 
civilian concepts and Roman discourses on method, the mos Ga/lieus and not 
the mos Britannicus which the English indeed, and ironically enough, always 
deemed to be much older than the law of the Romans, and the Venetians and 
the Greeks as well. Veritably antique, an archaism one could legitimately 
say. But that oblivion, or perceptual defence, or simple insouciance of course 
reflects as much the critic's resistance to law, the preconceptions of the 
theorist, the academic projections of practice and precedent. What I have 
argued, and fully aware that Samuel is exceptional in his erudition, 
exemplary in his knowledge of the detail of English private law, is that it has 
a history of discourses on method, a rich diachronic patterning. While this 
may well gain significant benefits from comparison to and revision by way 
of civil Jaw - these too were its roots - there is a necessary intermediary 
stage, a thing or two to be learned both as to resistance to theory and as to 
substantive curriculum and common use from the deep history, the sense of 
tradition, of the methodus - mode and rhythm - of custom and practice, of 
the long past of common law. 
LECTIO MIXTA , OR BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
The common plea of the critics of common law is not in any sense hostile to 
the argument that foreign sources, external theories, and civilian rules be taken 
seriously. Nor is there any argument as to the importance of method and the 
priority of history. Indeed, if exile and exodus have a predominant purpose, it 
is that of retooling, that precisely of learning those things that were missing 
from the legal curriculum. The more burning question - and my sense is that 
Geoffrey Samuel is already on his way to the channel tunnel train, leaving the 
white cliffs of Dover behind, as it were, for a richer foreign soil - is whether 
the excursion into the foreign disciplines ever leads to a return to Jaw, to 
common law, to little England. The critics have a tendency to go native, to find 
a greater interest or cause, in short, to abandon Jaw for administration, 
philosophy, film, Aix en Provence, China or the antipodes, as the case may be. 
Put it like this, the discourse on method is a precursor, a prolegomenon, 
because one studies method in relation to a practice and if the practice has 
evaporated, then method becomes an internal discourse, a study of 
methodology in general and not in any particular at all. Even interdisciplinary 
studies have to specify which disciplines they are not, and so engage with 
topics, and invent themes that fall between, below or outside the norm. 
3 7 Samuel, op. cit. (2008), n. 12, p. 3 15. 
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The first thing to say is that the recourse to the interdisciplinary at least 
expresses a desire, a willingness to account for the lacunae of law, an effort 
at self-reflection and a critical disciplinary self-awareness. Without some 
sense of the place of law within the disciplines, the before the law of the 
legal institution, to borrow from Kafka, there is no discipline at all. Just 
practice, professional guild conceit, the dust of records, the residue of 
archaisms, the esoterica of filing clerks and their judicial progeny. So the 
first step, materialist and historicist in its detail, is that of giving pause for 
thought. The interdisciplinary simply means the creation of a space, an 
institutional site for exchange, conversation, ratiocination, intellection, call it 
what you will, within which humanistic encounter knowledge can be shared 
and preconceptions questioned or explained. It sounds deceptively simple 
but such spaces are generally not available in law, where the community of 
lawyers tend to advocate rather than interrelate, and where closure dominates 
the discursive form. The seminar rooms, corridors, alcoves of law school are 
not so hospitable socially, neither are they open epistemically, disinclined as 
they tend to be to dialogue, nor in any obvious sense conversant either with 
the method of law or of other disciplines. Too often we meet the figure 
whom Doderidge nicely terms the legal temerist, the professor in a blind rush 
to judgment, intent only on proving his point, his worth and so conforming 
rather too easily to the almost comical persona of the 'authority paradigm', 
the dogmatist who cannot stay to explain in any sustained way why she 
thinks that philosophy, theory, hermeneutics, literature or deconstruction or 
some imagined spectre bearing that name should be banished, branded, 
destroyed. As if their opinion somehow carried an unreal and unreasoned 
weight. Which, of course, is the problem with the authority paradigm. 
The interdisciplinary paradigm, by contrast, opens up to the logic of 
chance, the chaos of thought, and the transformations of events. What is at 
issue, in other words, is a space of intellection, in publishing terms diverse 
fora of exchange, in pedagogic contexts mobile sites of interdisciplinary 
interaction. A coming face to face with other disciplines. Sounds easy, but it 
gets hard. Who will pay for that? Who will supervise, mediate, attend, and 
care for these critical but subversive, radical but secretive moments and 
occasions? Does coming back mean going underground? Or worse, being 
ridiculed, ignored, derided, in short, envied and dismissed, feared and 
discounted? Why such a price to pay and who in the end are now the 
guardians of academic law who dare to impose their views, their prejudices 
against the free play of thought? Put it like this, take an example indeed from 
the philosophy of science, the simplest of lessons, the hardest to hear, it is 
chance, humour, accident, and luck that have led to the greatest discoveries, 
the paradigm-changing events within the Western tradition.38 Give it a go, 
38 This, of course, was the central thesis of Paul Feyerabend: P. Feyerabend, Against 
Method (1976). 
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take off from some seemingly ·incidental or marginal, paradigm-defying 
instance, and see where it goes. That is the lesson that Feyerabend 
expounded, and we can find the same in the elegant historicism of Carlo 
Ginsberg: it is precisely the marginal, the unnoticed or overlooked elements 
in a painting that betray its veracity and allow the apprehension offorgery.39 
It is the Morellian method, a Freudian development which again allows us to 
note that there is much to be learned, and not just about the madness of Judge 
Schreber, from the pyschoanalytic school. That is a personal observation as 
well. If the critics who spend endless hours elaborating Freud, Lacan, Jung, 
Legendre, or indeed Adam Philips or Darian Leader, spent just a fraction of 
that time devoted to theory in addressing their own analysis, in practising 
what they preach, their interdisciplinarity would be immeasurably improved. 
But they tend not to, which suggests that the flip side of the authority 
paradigm, blind self-confidence, is narcissistic fury, a drive to exteriorize the 
pain within, a projection of the wound. 
Let me be explicit about the last point because it is a little close to the 
bone, and sometimes attracts criticism. I don't want the assessors, who will 
of course remain faceless and nameless, the bureaucratically co-opted legal 
academics, lacking any real training in or sense of method, taking me to task, 
lowering my ranking, denying me international recognition. I suspect that 
Professor Samuel could also beneficially attend to the point. So the argument 
is that the refusal of the theorist and critic to engage with law gets replicated 
in the inability of the expositors of psychoanalytic theory to address their 
own analysis. You could say that this is the madness of law but in fact, 
viewed historically, it is simply the desertion of the casuistic function of 
legal analysis, an opting out of one of the principal jurisdictions annexed to 
common law, that of the courts of conscience and their theological rules 
governing what happens in the soul. We use a different jargon now but our 
subject as lawyers is still in large measure the subject, the legal person and 
its actions, single and several, and because of this some understanding of 
persons, of subject formation, of interactive and communicative patterns and 
the critical skills by which to reflect upon them might well come in 
practically useful as well as theoretically important. Just consider for a 
moment the maxim that 'motive is not consideration' and think of it as an 
oratorical definition, as denial in Freudian terms, which it clearly is, and 
perhaps the picture becomes a hint clearer. We are constantly at the edge of 
our knowledge, on the boundary between law and desire, dealing with 
symptoms of historical repression, judicial evasion, social and economic 
exploitation. We are also, however, and the critics have tended to forget this, 
the product of those very same forces . They are in us as well as outside us. It 
is easier, let's put it as lightly as this, to treat their external manifestations 
rather than address their internal hold. 
39 C. Ginsberg, Myths, Emblems, Clues (1990). 
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There is perhaps, and this is my final point, a misapprehension that 
interdisciplinary studies could somehow resolve or move beyond the con-
flicts, the clashes of schools and other prises de positions that characterize 
common law educational institutions. I am not suggesting that at all. 
Interdisciplinary studies, and here I will resort again to the desirability of 
indiscipline, of simply opening a juncture, reserving a room, making a time or 
appointment for entering into the other discipline. In common law, which has 
no very strong tradition of disciplinary self-reflection - and much of this 
paper has been about recollecting forgotten pathways, lost treatises, dormant 
patterns - the value of the interdisciplinary is both practical and theoretical. 
At the practical level (let's start with that, it is ever popular in legal circles, 
however spurious - who after all is going to read this?), the early common 
lawyers were not entirely without insight. Samuel ignores them at his 
epistemic peril. They said that where law deals with a subject matter that is 
studied by another discipline - agronomics, economics, architecture, 
engineering, boatbuilding, medicine, linguistics, sociology, literature or one 
of the arts- then it is not without logic to seek advice from, become interested 
in, and learn from those other disciplines. A lawyer needs a little disciplinary 
bricolage, an open mind, skill in inquiry as opposed to imposition. 
The theoretical point is that theory should listen. We can learn here from 
the Roman concept of lectio mixta associated with humanist legal reforms of 
the early modem era. The lectio mixta was a reading that attended to 
competing claims or norms, for example, the diverse proposals that could be 
drawn from poetry, literature, and law with respect to a given dispute. The 
lectio mixta proposed reading all of those sources, attending to their 
diversity, treating them as equal and then, if necessary, after interdisciplinary 
deliberation, deciding in response to all three. It is an oxymoronic procedure 
in rhetorical argot but that sounds rather strange. The argument is simply and 
again that the subject matter of dispute, say contract provisions, requires 
attending to who made the agreement, in what context, and when. Contract 
lawyers are full of concepts of intention, of words as 'messengers of men's 
minds' and interdisciplinarity simply suggests taking those messengers and 
messages seriously. What is written is representative rather than definitive, 
plural in meaning rather than singular, and so a properly theoretical approach 
will address the sociology of the subjects, the economics of the exchange, the 
political institutions and ethical forces that were at play. That is simple and 
yet scholarly hermeneutics. There are levels to the text and the scholar draws 
those out and gives them air. That is the just thing to do. And by the same 
token, ifwe are dealing with an international contract, a treaty, then as Carty 
expounds it, the very same questions, addressed best through the appre-
hension of history - knowing what one is talking about is never a harm - as 
also through the literature of diplomacy and political theory together, suggest 
that critical scholarship inform itself fully of the relations of power, the 
history of groups, the minorities and the majorities, the narratives of war, 
annexation, and suppression that motivate and put the treaty into play. 
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It is the beauty of theory that ·it does not require decision but, rather, and 
only, argument, knowledge, and insight brought to bear as invention and 
intervention. The social responsibility of the legal theorist, the inter-
disciplinary scholar mooted here, is that of actually doing the work of theory, 
by which I mean coming to know their subject and having the courage to 
intervene, to speak to it. That requires pushing past the cliques and coteries, 
the exclusions and bumpings that the academy with all its wealth of self-
generated insignificance is so fond of purveying. Preferring knowledge to 
fashion, thought to repetition, indiscipline to imposition, are the virtues of 
the interdisciplinary, of inquiry over authority. If, as Agamben suggests, we 
exist still within a legal administration, a normative order that is 
predominantly choral and liturgical, as much propelled by acclamation as 
cerebration, then it is also an act of courage, a moment of indiscipline, to 
take the 'sciences liberall' seriously, to try to come to know. 
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